parents involved in community schools v seattle 2007 quizlet

No. It therefore reversed the lower courts original finding of no discrimination and remanded, instructing the lower court to issue an injunction to prevent the District from using this system. The majority acknowledges that in prior cases this Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling: an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination, and an interest in diversity in higher education. Ante, at 12, 13. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. at 11 and Brief of Historians of the Civil Rights Era William H. Chafe, Davison Douglas, Charles Payne, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Kenneth Mack, Risa Goluboff, Kevin Kruse and Matt Lassiter as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23. In each case, the school district relies upon an individual students race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. in No. While the government is not required to take race into account to address problems arising from racial discrimination, it is constitutionally permitted to do so. These include the types of activities or programs offered, the teachers, and the schools location. in No. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts own terms, the costs are undeniable. See supra, at 4648. The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school. are abandoning the policy of segregation whenever local conditions and local attitudes make it feasible), Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Other studies reach different conclusions. See also Brief for Appellees in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. Rather, such powers should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution. 515 U. S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). We relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 segregated its schools in the District of Columbia); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Courts case file) (reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation). As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. in KentuckyThe Second Year After the Supreme Courts Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. 252, 42 U. S.C. 2000d. Jefferson County fails to make clear to this Courteven in the limited respects implicated by Joshuas initial assignment and transfer denialwhether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and adhoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest. See Grutter, supra, at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing consideration of race only if it does not become a predominant factor). Roberts concludes his opinion for the plurality by saying: The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. 05915, Meredith, Custodial Parent and Next Friend of McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. before adopting (or permitting the parties to agree on) a remedy . [Footnote 7], When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002, she sought to enroll her son, Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 20022003 school year. There was no doubt that the county had operated a dual school system, McDaniel, supra, at 41, and no one questions that the obligation to disestablish a school system segregated by law can include race-conscious remedieswhether or not a court had issued an order to that effect. These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two local school boards to integrate their public schools. Their decision leaves thousands Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) (plaintiff) were parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race. The District has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes outweigh the cost of subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely upon the color of their skin. 377 F.3d, at 984985 (footnote omitted). gation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with Browns requirements? 05908, p.9, n. 9. Statements after the decision The Seattle public schools have not shown they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to court ordered desegregation decrees. United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 458 U. S., at 535, n.11. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time . 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown the Supreme Courts greatest anti-discrimination decision); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. These changes conformed with the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. Thus about 2,000 students out of a total district population of about 60,000 students were involved in one or the other transfer program. Cities around the country are often segregated based on race with certain racial or ethnic groups concentrated in particular areas, possibly as a result of poverty or immigration. More recently, however, progress has stalled. Petitioners, an organization of Seattle parents (Parents Involved) and the mother of a Jefferson County student (Joshua), whose children were or could be assigned under the foregoing plans, filed these suits contending, inter alia, that allocating children to different public schools based solely on their race violates the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection guarantee. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. in No. Post, at 3436 (citing 426 F.3d 1162, 11931194 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 2829 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). In Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to admit was an undefined meaningful number necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body. Ante, at 6; ante, at 1516 (opinion of the Court). See Welch 8391. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional. 1 Administrative Complaint in Seattle Branch, NAACP v. Seattle School Dist. The District further argues that the plan passes muster under the strictest scrutiny. Nor does any precedent indicate, as the plurality suggests with respect to Louisville, ante, at 29, that remedial interests vanish the day after a federal court declares that a district is unitary. Of course, Louisville adopted those portions of the plan at issue here before a court declared Louisville unitary. Moreover, in Freeman, this Court pointed out that in one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Code 2.60.020 (2006), certified the state-law question to the Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2002) (Parents Involved IV). 618206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. 1, 3, 5 (Apr. Accord, post, at 68 (Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically. The dissent does not and cannot answer these questions because the contours of the distinction it propounds rest entirely in the eye of the beholder. See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 74142 (No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process). Jenkins, supra, at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 of Oral Arg. The Court need not resolve the parties dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. Indeed, if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories. 1806, 20 U. S.C. 7231 et seq. The District contends that these requirements are not met in this case. See, e.g., Exec. Get Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. Project Renaissance again revised the boards racial guidelines. The Court split 414 on key aspects of the case, with Justice Kennedy writing the swing vote opinion and agreeing with four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) that the programs used by Seattle and Louisville did not pass constitutional muster (because the districts failed to demonstrate that their plans were sufficiently narrowly tailored), but Kennedy also found, along with four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg), that compelling interests exist in avoiding racial isolation and promoting diversity. It added that the fact that a law treats [a person] unequally because of his or her race . in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. In order to create a numerical racial balance among its 10 public high schools, the Seattle School District assigned students among them. Parents Involved, the Court noted that: Seattle and Louisville had not demonstrated that they seriously considered race-neutral alternatives; the individual racial classifications used had a minimal impact that cast doubt on their necessity; the districts defined Certainly if the constitutionality of the stark use of race in these cases were as established as the dissent would have it, there would have been no need for the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter. When asked for a range of percentage that would be diverse, however, Seattles expert said it was important to have sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality. App. The fact that the controlling opinion would make a school districts use of such criteria often unlawful (and the pluralitys colorblind view would make such use always unlawful) suggests that todays opinion will require setting aside the laws of several States and many local communities. 4, p.86 ([Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion), with post, at 57 (The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document). The Seattle School Board challenged the constitutionality of the initiative. In 2001, after the decree had been dissolved, Jefferson County adopted the voluntary student assignment plan at issue in this case. Swann, 402 U. S., at 16. Evidence from the Segregated Schooling of African American Children, in Beyond Desegregation 209226 (M. Shujaa ed. Moreover, this Court from Swann to Grutter has treated these civic effects as an important virtue of racially diverse education. The fact that racial discrimination was preferable to the relevant communities was irrelevant to the Brown Court. Every 9th or 10th grader could apply to any high school in the system, and the high school would accept applicants according to set criteriaone of which consisted of the need to attain or remain in compliance with the plans racial guidelines. 1, pp. The districts past and current plans are not unique. 1991). (a)Because racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting), governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based on individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505506. I am not aware of any case in which this Court has read the narrow tailoring test to impose such a requirement. Seattle School District No. See also ante, at 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 491 U.S. 524, 54142 (1989) (Scalia, concurring). of Oral Arg. Thus, the programs are subject to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens. Tr. They were further persuaded that these plans differed from other race-based programs this Court has considered because they are certainly more benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group, Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 28 (Boudin, C.J., concurring), and they are far from the original evils at which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed, id., at 29; 426 F.3d, at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. More broadly, however, allowing racial diversity or balance as a compelling state interest, even if confined to secondary education, calls into question the Equal. At the same time, these compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the present inquiry. Id. Unlike todays decision, they were also entirely loyal to Brown. The boards work in communities where demographic patterns change, where they must meet traditional learning goals, where they must attract and retain effective teachers, where they should (and will) take account of parents views and maintain their commitment to public school education, where they must adapt to court intervention, where they must encourage voluntary student and parent actionwhere they will find that their own good faith, their knowledge, and their understanding of local circumstances are always necessary but often insufficient to solve the problems at hand. See 377 F.3d 949, 10051006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting). Finally, the outcome of this case will give some perspective into how the new composition of the Supreme Court views the still controversial issue of affirmative action. Both districts also considered elaborate studies and consulted widely within their communities. The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the de jure/de facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may be constitutionally required to undertake. The plan provoked considerable local opposition. Seattle Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 461466 (1982). in No. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do. Brief for Petitioner at 11. (rejecting argument that strict scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that disadvantage minorities, stating [r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination). Croson, 488 U. S., at 504. [Footnote 25] And just as the dissent argues that the need for these programs will lessen over time, the segregationists claimed that reliance on segregation was lessening and might eventually end. The Courts decision in that case was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. See Brief for Respondents in No. Brief for Respondent at 33, 43. The Court rejected the interests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling. into account. Adarand, supra, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. Approximately 307 student assignments were affected by the racial tiebreaker in 20002001; the district was able to track the enrollment status of 293 of these students. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 316 (1986) (same). The District further points to the line of Supreme Court cases requiring that schools desegregate even when such segregation was simply the effect of where the districts boundaries were drawn. 1, p. 7 (We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens); Tr. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. Ibid. Am. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives", Grutter, supra, at 339, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. When a court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the government. of City School Dist. Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny. And if this is a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it. The Seattle case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. The rights established are personal rights). See ante, at 1213. That principle has been accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993), an injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly claim on behalf of their children. 05915, p. 48, but we are nonetheless obliged to ensure that it exists, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). In 1987, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights studied 125 large school districts seeking integration. Pp. Given that state law had previously required the school board to maintain a dual school system, the county was obligated to take measures to remedy its prior de jure segregation. Indeed in Louisville itself the achievement gap between black and white elementary school students grew substantially smaller (by seven percentage points) after the integration plan was implemented in 1975.

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